Chapter 4: State of Play

It’s time to leave the science and engineering behind, and turn towards the ‘real’ world, full of companies and employees and investors and financialization. Quantum computing is no longer a pet project of academia; it is a proper industry. Companies in this space have become increasingly mature and capable of raising large amounts of capital. In 2025 alone, the quantum industry raised $4.9 billion in venture capital money , and around $12.6 billion in total capital, a roughly 6x increase from 2024 . There are several public quantum computing companies, with several more coming along the way. At the time of writing, the Trump administration has pledged an additional $2 billion in investment , making US government support of the industry explicit. Governments in the EU and Australia have also made quantum computing a key plank of future technological development strategy . There are enormous expectations and stakes for the field, a far cry from the situation from even 5 years ago.

Why is this happening, and why now? Why is this sleepy, academic field suddenly an enormous sink for public, venture, and retail capital? The short answer is that the field A) has tremendous capacity for absorbing capital, given the massive technological hurdles it must overcome; B) has an enormous amount of hype swirling around it.

But quantum computing is not a ‘natural’ fit for most of these types of capital. Despite the growing maturity and size of the industry, the technology is extremely nascent, the applications uncertain, and the revenues miniscule! Let’s go down the list: funding high-risk technological bets is indeed the purview of government agencies like the NSF, DOE, and DOD (through innovation arms like DARPA). As a result, much of the initial research funding for quantum academic labs came from these organizations - and government funding remains an important capital source to this day. Then, quantum startups and spin-outs began to be founded in the 2000s, and attracted both this public funding and venture capital investments.

But historically, VC money hasn’t typically gone to industries like quantum computing. Despite its roots in funding the California semiconductor companies (Intel, Fairchild, etc.), the vast majority of venture dollars have gone to capital-light software companies, which promise investors huge returns per dollar invested. Hardware companies, by comparison, have significantly greater capital needs, considering the cost of fundamental R&D, equipment, manufacturing, etc. Quantum computing is an extreme example of this, where the technical and market risk of the industry is still extremely high, even decades in. And yet, in the past two years especially, massive amounts of capital have piled into the field from venture capital firms. Consequently, the universe of quantum startups has exploded, consisting of over 200 firms targeting different hardware platforms, applications, and places in the software/hardware stack.

It’s also a bit of a historical aberration that there are several public, pure play quantum computing companies. Historically, public markets have been reserved for companies that have a history of profitability, and going public was a way to simultaneously reward existing investors with liquidity; raise additional capital from the bigger public markets; and expand access to the company’s growth to the common retail investor (sounds a bit socialistic, no?). Over time, these expectations have shifted. In the mid-2010s, startups like Facebook, Uber, and Snap went public with no profits! Uber’s IPO enabled the company to finally consolidate market share, raise prices, and become profitable. Snap meanwhile, has tread water, never really achieving profitability.

In the early 2020s, we saw companies with even more speculative and uncertain business models go public, typically via a ‘Special Purpose Acquisition Company’, or SPAC. A SPAC is a public entity which raises money from investors, typically at $10 per share. It then goes out and tries to use its big pot of cash to find a target to take public. The SPAC often also finds some private investors who will co-invest in the target company, and brings it to its shareholders for a vote. If the vote succeeds, the firms ‘de-SPAC’, merging into one publicly traded entity. The SPAC shareholders can either get shares of the company, or their original money back, plus interest . Advocates for SPACs tout that the process is lower cost and lower risk compared to the traditional IPO. Detractors point to a number of facts: That SPAC sponsors (the people organizing the SPAC) get a huge bucket of shares for a very small initial investment, misaligning their incentives from the SPAC shareholders and that historically de-SPAC’ed companies have performed very poorly once they’ve gone public . Ostensibly this all happens because SPACs have lightened regulatory scrutiny than IPOs, and generally target more speculative and less mature businesses.

Several quantum companies went public during this 2021-22 SPAC boom – IonQ, Rigetti, and D-Wave, raising about a billion dollars cumulatively. To me, what makes these companies singular, especially in comparison to their public cohort, is their lack of revenue. There are commonly accepted ways to translate a company’s income into estimates of its total enterprise value: most simplistic is the idea of a price to earnings ratio (P/E ratio). A typical P/E ratio might be something like 10 to 30x, which sort of makes sense. If you were to buy the company for a price that was 20x its earnings, you’d expect to return your investment in 20 years with no growth, and hopefully faster if the business continues to grow.

These public quantum companies not only have negative earnings (they are unprofitable), but have virtually no revenue, and likely won’t be making substantial amounts anytime soon. This is in stark contrast to even the most rickety tech IPOs of recent years. Snap, which went public in 2018, had about half a billion dollars in revenue its first year of being public (it was unprofitable, but that’s a different story - investors were paying for growth!); IonQ had about $10 million.

This trend has continued even today. After a few quiet years for IPOs and SPACs, 2026 has been a boon for new entrants into public markets: Infleqtion, Xanadu, Horizon Quantum, and Quantinuum have all gone public (Quantinuum notably via a traditional IPO!). While their revenue figures are not substantial, their enterprise valuations range between single digit and tens of billions of dollars.

So quantum computing is an outlier in both public and private markets. I can point to a few interrelated reasons why this is the case: